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 INTERPENETRATION OF POWERS: CHANNELS AND 
OBSTACLES FOR POPULIST IMPULSES 
Anya Bernstein† 
 Abstract:  Discussions of populism often focus on the most visible points of 
executive power: individual leaders. Yet individual leaders only accomplish things through 
administrative apparatuses that enable and support their power. Rejecting a political 
theology that imagines sovereignty as inhering in a single decision-maker, this article turns 
to political pragmatics focused on the people who populate the government. I draw on 
interviews with administrators in the government of two successful but quite different 
democracies. The first is the United States, an old, flagship democratic state. The second 
is Taiwan, which transitioned from a four-decade military dictatorship to a vibrant 
democracy in the late twentieth century.  
My interviews probe how administrators understand their work and how they describe the 
conditions for its legitimacy. Many Taiwanese administrators tend to present their 
regulatory practices as highly dialogic and legitimated through ongoing interactions with 
multiple outside influences, including the legislature and multiple public sectors. Many 
American administrators, in contrast, tend to hew to a more rigid notion of separated 
powers, in which too much interaction with those outside the executive threatens the 
legitimacy of agency action.  
My Taiwanese interviewees’ idealized state-involved government branches highly 
integrated with one another and their surrounding society. I suggest that this insistence on 
interpenetration as a hallmark of legitimacy presents conceptual obstacles to populist 
impulses, which seek to cordon-off executive action from outside influence and bypass 
legislative power and public influence. In contrast, the ideal of separated, antagonistic 
powers that underlies my American interviewees’ descriptions of their work presents 
potentially hospitable channels for the flow of such populist desires.  
Cite as: Anya Bernstein, Interpenetration of Powers: Channels and Obstacles for Populist 
Impulses, 28 WASH. INT’L L.J. 461 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION: SEPARATION OF POWERS CONSCIOUSNESS 
 The idea of populism is famously slippery: there is no clear, coherent, 
or consistent standard to hold it to.1 That is, no doubt, part of its power, just 
as it is part of the power of populist leaders themselves.2 Many commentators 
                                                 
†  anyabern@buffalo.edu. Associate Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law. JD, Yale Law 
School; PhD, University of Chicago (Anthropology). I am grateful for the generous support of the Academia 
Sinica Institutum Iurisprudentiae, which allowed me to undertake much of the research reported in this article. 
Cheng-Yi Huang, Yun-Chien Chang, and Chuan-Feng Wu helped me think through and undertake the 
research. Many thanks to Cheng-Yi Huang for organizing the stimulating Academia Sinica conference that 
formed the basis for this symposium.  
1  See generally David Fontana, Unbundling Populism, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1482, 1485 (2018) 
(“Populism . . . is a they, and not an it.”). 
2  See generally Jean Comaroff, Populism and Late Liberalism: A Special Affinity?, 637 AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100 (2011) (arguing that “populism is what linguists call a shifter . . . its deployment 
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agree that populism tends to draw on Manichean oppositions: a “pure people” 
set against a “corrupt elite;”3 a “will of the people” uniquely identifiable by 
the populist leader and set against a class of oppressive masters.4 But it also 
goes beyond just pitting two groups against each other; it suggests a solution 
to the body politic, in the body of one person.  
 Populism claims for its leader a unique ability to hear the demands of 
the popular will. This ability justifies bypassing those intermediaries who 
normally produce, interpret, and implement the law, such as legislators, 
judges, and government administrators. 5  Indeed, members of those 
institutions become easily assimilable to that corrupt elite class of masters 
against whom the populist leader protects the people. Government institutions 
are part of the problem that the populist leader promises to solve.6  
 Instead, the populist’s claim to legitimacy rests on another claim: direct 
communication. The populist, on this image, hears and speaks to the people 
themselves, not just their representatives.7 And his communication with the 
people bypasses the ordinary institutions of government, in speeches, rallies, 
or, now, in tweets.8 Perhaps concomitantly, while communication is presented 
as a dialogue between the people and their leader, power and authority are 
imagined as unidirectional: they flow only from the leader on high down to 
the people below. By discrediting the ability of the standard intervening 
institutions of democracy to legitimately express, enact, or respond to the 
people’s will, and by presenting the people as too oppressed and dispersed to 
                                                 
being more about marking difference than denoting content, and its meaning being largely relative to the 
standpoint from which it is deployed.”).  
3  CAS MUDDE & CRISTÓBAL ROVIRA KALTWASSER, POPULISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 6 
(2017). 
4  See generally BENJAMIN MOFFITT, THE GLOBAL RISE OF POPULISM: PERFORMANCE, POLITICAL 
STYLE, AND REPRESENTATION 95 (2016).  
5  Emiliana De Blasio & Michele Sorice, Populism Between Direct Democracy and the Technological 
Myth, 4 PALGRAVE COMM. 1, 3 (2018) (“[P]opulist movements and parties tend to reject the logic of 
participatory democracy [and] the methods of deliberation.”).  
6  See, e.g., HANS-GEORG BETZ, RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN WESTERN EUROPE 2 (1994) 
(linking the rise of populism in Europe with a “disenchantment with the major political and social institutions 
[and] the weakening . . . of electoral alignments”).  
7  See, e.g., Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L. 
REV. 71 (2017) (analyzing the role of unscripted presidential utterances for litigation).  
8  Douglas B. McKechnie, From Secret White House Recordings to @realDonaldTrump: The 
Democratic Value of Presidential Tweets, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 611, 638 (2018) (arguing that U.S. President 
Trump’s tweets have democracy-enhancing value because they reveal an unguarded, intimate version of the 
President’s personality). 
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enact their will themselves, the populist leader positions himself as the only 
legitimated actor left.  
 Perhaps that is why, at moments of heightened executive power 
consolidation, it is tempting to fall back on Carl Schmitt’s oracular slogan: 
“Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”9 Schmitt’s idea, so influential 
at various moments over the last century, locates sovereignty in the power to 
sidestep the “general norm, as represented by . . . ordinary legal 
prescription,”10 in favor of “the exception, which is not codified in the existing 
legal order.”11 This ability to make that decision, to declare the suspension of 
the normal order, is what constitutes sovereign power according to Schmitt.12  
 Schmitt provides a powerful description of a populist leader’s 
aspirations: to successfully claim a unique and hyper-legitimate connection to 
the populace;13 to not only head a unified executive but, ideally, to unify the 
entire government under the leader’s power. The leader derives this 
superordinate legitimacy from his direct communication with the people. He 
instantiates it through the ability to decide on the parameters of his own power. 
Schmitt’s version of sovereignty—an individual who controls the entire state 
apparatus from a position not constrained by law or other institutions—
presents the very image that the populist leader strives to project.  
 Yet, like most oracles, Schmitt’s pronouncement distorts as much as it 
reveals.  Framing sovereignty as centered on a single, decisive actor distorts 
the realities of political action. A decision, after all, does not enact itself. 
Political results never ride on one single decider; they always depend on the 
mobilization of numerous individuals and institutions. This distortion 
obscures the multiple communicative encounters, ongoing relationships, and 
multidirectional channels of efficacy at the heart of any political act—even 
those acts that appear autonomous, authoritative, and sovereign. And it 
ignores the multiplicities—of personality, motivation, competence, and 
                                                 
9  CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 
(George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922). 
10  Id. at 6. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 7 (“[The sovereign] decides whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be 
done to eliminate it. Although he stands outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to 
it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended.”).  
13  See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 4, at 96 (discussing how populist discourses construct a notion of the 
populace).  
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authority—that characterize any modern state.14 The executive, after all, is a 
they, not an it; not an individual but an institution with a social life of its own 
and a place in its wider society.15 
 The idea that a single person can control—or even keep track of—the 
governmental apparatus of a populous nation is exactly the sort of fantasy that 
would-be autocrats would have people believe.16 Governments, after all, are 
highly internally variegated. 17  There are long-term employees and recent 
newcomers; there are political appointees and career civil servants. There are 
people who have imbibed the mission, culture, or habits of their agency, and 
others who chafe at those things. There are those who dutifully follow new 
directives, those who try to subvert them, and those who figure whatever is 
now will pass and move slowly to make it pass faster.18 Each of these people, 
moreover, exists in a wider social world with its cultural proclivities, and 
within an individual biographical trajectory with its influences and 
convictions.19 And in many places, these people are also subject to the kind of 
power they wield. In democracies with the rule of law, at least, administrators 
are both the subjects and the objects of regulation.20 
 I do not mean to say that a single person cannot amass power within 
the state apparatus. But when he does, he does so through this multiplicity of 
personalities and institutions. Tracking populist (or other) consolidation, then, 
necessarily involves looking to the complex of institutions and individuals 
who together create governance—not just at the person who claims to control 
them. Behind any single person who appears to personify a unified 
government stands the disaggregated mess of human interactivity that we 
                                                 
14  See, e.g., Comaroff, supra note 2, at 103 (arguing that populism “is in itself never enough to fuel 
sustained, politically constructive mobilizations”). 
15  Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).  
16  See also TIMOTHY MITCHELL, STATE/CULTURE: STATE-FORMATION AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN 
76–97 (George Steinmetz ed., 1999) (noting that governments often create the illusion of internal coherence 
and external separateness from their society, a process Mitchell calls the “state effect”).  
17  See MATTHEW S. HULL, GOVERNMENT OF PAPER: THE MATERIALITY OF BUREAUCRACY IN URBAN 
PAKISTAN 129–30 (2012) (noting that understanding government action involves “understand[ing] 
collectivization and individuation as simultaneous functions of the same bureaucratic process, taking neither 
the agency of the individual nor the organization as given”). 
18  See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 57, 62–64 (1991) (describing range of personnel typically involved in rulemaking process within one 
U.S. agency).  
19  See generally Anya Bernstein, Bureaucratic Speech: Language Choice and Democratic Identity in 
the Taipei Bureaucracy, 40 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 28 (2017).  
20  See generally Anya Bernstein, The Social Life of Regulation in Taipei City Hall: The Role of 
Legality in the Administrative Bureaucracy, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 925 (2008).  
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encounter when we enter the domain of the state. Talking about populism as 
an existing governmental phenomenon, thus, often buys into the populist’s 
claims. It mistakes the conductor for the orchestra.  
 As an attempt to accurately describe executive power, then, the 
Schmittian phrase fails; it gives voice to a desire more than an analysis. Yet it 
is also revealing in its own way. It instantiates the way that both those who 
participate in politics and those who write about it can become so focused on 
highly visible individuals that we neglect the social infrastructure that both 
undergirds and channels their actions.  
 A contrasting contemporaneous view takes the plurality of any political 
effect more into account. Hannah Arendt’s notion of political action takes its 
multiplicity and unpredictability as central features. Action “is essentially 
always the beginning of something new.”21 It is conduct that has creative 
effects in the world precisely because it is taken up—and potentially 
transformed—by others.22 It entails a lack of total control: “we start something. 
We weave our strand into a network of relations. What comes of it we never 
know . . . because one cannot know.”23 Recognizing the effects of action has 
a helpless quality to it: we must “come to terms with what irrevocably 
happened and be reconciled with what unavoidably exists.” 24  This 
helplessness, however, is merely the natural result of rejecting an 
understanding of the state that is primarily theological, and hence theoretical. 
For Schmitt, the essential characteristics of sovereignty emerge from the 
scholar’s own definition of it. Arendt in contrast suggests a pragmatic 
approach, where an understanding of government grows out of its observed 
conduct.25 
 Understanding the populist potential of executive power requires 
following Arendt’s lead. The tight logical structures and insistent clarity of 
political theology do not describe existing politics. On the contrary, political 
                                                 
21  HANNAH ARENDT, ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING: 1930–1954, 320–21 (Jerome Kohn ed., 1994). 
22  HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 25, 198 (1958) (naming this kind of efficacious yet 
contingent action and speech as the two categories of human activity “out of which rises the realm of human 
affairs”).  
23  HANNAH ARENDT, THE PORTABLE HANNAH ARENDT 21 (Peter Baehr ed., 2000).  
24  ARENDT, ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING, supra note 21, at 322. 
25  This pragmatism matches up with that of the American Pragmatists, for whom reality inhered not 
in a theoretical articulation of truth but in actual effects in the world. See CHARLES S. PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL 
WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 259 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955) (“Consider what effects that might conceivably have 
practical bearing you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects 
is the WHOLE of your conception of the object”).  
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theology is itself one of the dangers that populist leaders pose to democratic 
regimes. It is easy to take claims of consolidated executive power at their word, 
neglecting the variety of ways that people who work in government structure 
its conduct. But a leader’s power extends only as far as government workers 
allow it to go.  
 So rather than focusing on highly visible leaders, I talk to those who 
make any political decision actionable: bureaucrats. Drawing on interviews 
with government personnel, I ask how those who populate governments 
conceive of their own role in the political process. What is the “separation of 
powers consciousness”26 (as one of my interviewees put it) of those who 
populate administrative agencies? How can political structures and cultures 
come to different assumptions about the networks relating government 
nodes?27 What renders power and decision-making authority legitimate for 
those who wield and enable it? I suggest that political structures can be home 
to a range of conceptions about how government power should operate.28  
 To get a sense of the breadth of conceptions available, I interview 
administrators in two successful, but quite different, democracies: The United 
States and Taiwan (Republic of China). My U.S. interviewees operate in a 
longstanding flagship democracy, their work is structured by administrative 
procedures inscribed into law over seven decades ago. The Taiwanese 
administrators I interview, in contrast, saw their country move quickly from 
decades of dictatorship to full-fledged democracy over the final years of the 
twentieth century. Many were already working government jobs when the 
country passed its first law imposing constraints on administrative procedures. 
With martial law a living memory and democracy widely considered a 
continual work in progress, we can posit that these administrators may bring 
different attitudes, presuppositions, and values into play than their American 
counterparts.29 Rather than assume that all democracies, or all employees of 
democratic states, share the same conception of legitimate governance, I 
                                                 
26  Interview with Taiwanese public law court judge (Nov. 2017).  
27  See generally Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New 
Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 861 (2011) (arguing that 
administrative law scholarship should inquire into the social networks, rather than just the legal constraints, 
within which administrators act).  
28  See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 639–40 (2000) 
(explaining that separation of powers structures have far-reaching implications not only for all branches of 
government but also, more broadly, for conceptions and implementations of democracy, self-government, 
and the protection of individual rights).  
29  See generally Bernstein, supra note 19.  
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analyze the how workers in these different democracies present and legitimize 
their work.  
 I suggest below that such different conceptions can provide different 
environments for populist aspirations. They can form smooth channels along 
which populist impulses can flow, or, alternatively, throw up obstacles to 
populist consolidation. My interviews reveal a striking contrast in how 
American and Taiwanese administrators imagine power situated within their 
respective governments. American administrators present an image of a 
government divided: separate nodes bear different kinds of power, and 
interactions are limited and discouraged. Even where the realities of 
government organization entail considerable interaction—as, for instance, in 
the extensive role of agency personnel in statute drafting—the image my 
interviewees present remains static and separate.  
 This view is consistent with a vision of power relations popularized in 
some recent arguments about the separation of powers in the United States. 
Arguments consonant with unitary executive theory present government 
branches not only as possessing different expertise and fulfilling different 
central functions. They also present each branch as jealously guarding its 
powers against the others’ incursions. On this view, America’s system 
discourages cooperation and coordination, instead assuming that each branch 
will amass as much power for itself as it can. This view of government 
organization resonates in my interviewees’ image of the executive branch they 
work for. It also supports a vision of government in which the executive 
branch could properly seek to block out democratic channels of representation, 
influence, and authority. On this view, each arena of governmental power is 
ideally immune from intrusion by the others. This American view thus 
provides, at the level of assumptions about legitimate government 
organization, a hospitable environment for populist impulses.  
 My Taiwanese interviewees, in contrast, present an image of 
government shot through with dialogue, debate, and ongoing mutual influence. 
Administrators participate openly and explicitly in legislative processes. 
Legislators instruct agencies on the proper way to interpret and implement 
statutes. And much agency work is done by nongovernmental parties whose 
participation is explicitly invoked and sometimes even legally required, not 
just hidden in webs of back-channel communication.  
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 This image presents government as indelibly interactive: there are 
ideally no nodes protected from the influence and incursion of others. 
Taiwan’s experience with democracy is much more recent than that of the 
United States. Either despite democracy’s recent onset or because of it, 
Taiwanese administrators’ understanding of the proper structure of 
government validates an interpenetration of powers. In this image, a populist 
bypassing representative institutions would be nakedly illegitimate—an 
ideological aberration rather than an extension of existing commitments. The 
assumptions of administrators in this new democracy provide fewer clear 
channels for populist ideology.  
II. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS: THE POLITICAL IDENTITY OF THOSE WHO 
GOVERN 
 In this Article, I explore the political identities of those who populate 
the government. These people have historically been neglected by both 
scholars and commentators, who tend to pay attention either to individual 
leaders, or to depersonalized structures of government.30 Those structures, 
however, both have effects on, and are also reciprocally affected by, the 
people who inhabit them. That ongoing mutual influence—the way that 
personal stakes, backgrounds, and relationships influence the workings of 
even organizations as large and as complicated as government—is easy to lose 
sight of. In part, that is a natural result of the size and complexity of the 
institution itself; it is just hard to keep track. But in part, it also arises from the 
difficulty of studying bureaucracies and similar organizations.  
 Max Weber provided the still classic description of government 
bureaucracy, laid out in a chapter of Economy and Society, as well as in 
scattered references throughout his writing.31 Weber’s discussion focused on 
the standardized, impersonal nature of government work: “The purely 
impersonal character of the office, with its separation of the private sphere 
from that of the official activities, facilitates the official’s integration into the 
given functional conditions of the disciplined mechanism” that is 
                                                 
30  But see Colin Hoag & Matthew Hull, A Review of the Anthropological Literature on the Civil 
Service (World Bank Group Dev. Research Grp. Impact Evaluation Team. Working Paper No. 8081, 2017), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/492901496250951775/A-review-of-the-anthropological-
literature-on-the-civil-service (providing an overview of recent scholarship taking a cultural approach 
government personnel).  
31  See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 956 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).  
 
April 2019  Interpenetration of Powers 469 
 
government.32 This view, which presents each participant in the system as 
“only a small cog in a ceaselessly moving mechanism [which] prescribes to 
him an essentially fixed route of march,”33 remains highly influential in both 
scholarship and popular discourse.34  
 Yet, as William Novak has forcefully argued, at least the popular take-
up of Weber’s approach leaves out a range of considerations that we otherwise 
find essential both for describing human activity and for evaluating 
specifically democratic politics. The “Weberian legacy in thinking about the 
state,” Novak argued, “remains tethered to an essentially aristocratic 
rendering of statecraft—a state concept focused on . . . elites at the center of 
power. . . . ‘[A]s if the actual state were not the people.’”35 This, Novak says, 
leads to studying the state as though it were autonomous and an essentially 
unified elite institution, an “evacuation of democracy” from understandings 
of the state that gives rise to “a crimped understanding of statecraft” that 
cannot realistically recognize the variety and extent of modern state action.36 
 Asking how those who occupy the centers of the state conceive of their 
relations to one another and the democratic process that structures their power 
helps counteract this tendency. It allows us to see in detail how the “actual 
state” is precisely “the people.”37 Talking to state employees directly provides 
one way to get past ideas that present the state as a kind of aristocratic 
machine—a center peopled by elite but predictable cogs. 38  These 
organizations have effects on the world in undulating ways, sometimes 
operating inaccessibly, other times rearing up into public visibility; 39 
sometimes acting through identifiable individuals, other times amalgamating 
                                                 
32  Id. at 968.  
33  Id. at 989. 
34  William J. Novak, Beyond Max Weber: The Need for a Democratic (Not Aristocratic) Theory of the 
Modern State, 36 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 43, 54 (2015) (“Weber’s conception of the state . . . continues to 
dominate and proliferate”).  
35  Id. at 69 (quoting KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 85–86 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton 
trans., 1975)). 
36  Id. at 79.  
37  Id. at 69 (quoting KARL MARX: EARLY WRITINGS 85–86 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregor Benton 
trans., 1975)). 
38  See Martin Albrow, Sine Ire et Studio—or Do Organizations Have Feelings?, 13 ORG. STUD. 313, 
326 (1992) (arguing for the “recognition of affectivity as a key aspect of organizational performance”).  
39  See Anya Bernstein, Agency in State Agencies, in DISTRIBUTED AGENCY 41 (N.J. Enfield & Paul 
Kockelman eds., 2017). 
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into collective action;40 sometimes mechanistically following set procedures, 
other times shaped by individual personalities and relationships.41  
 It is, thus, important to take the worldviews and commitments of 
government personnel seriously. After all, they critically determine how 
government functions.42 Weber tells us that bloodline stops mattering in a 
bureaucratized state, where participation is determined by more objective 
measures like performance on civil service exams. But recognizing the 
introduction of objective measures in constructing paths into the state should 
not lead us to assume that those within the state are depersonalized. The 
lowered importance of status to government employment—in Maine’s classic 
sense of aristocratic family position43—does not imply that individual views 
and personalities stop mattering, too. 
 Novak suggests that we open up our ideas of state functioning to allow 
for of the kind of outside influence that seems appropriate to a democracy. In 
the same vein, we can ask whether our ideas of separation of powers have that 
kind of openness as well. In other words, when we look to the people who 
populate the state, we can ask how they conceive of their work in relation to 
both other parts of the state and to people outside it.44  
 I focus here primarily on Taiwan, a recently democratized polity that 
has undergone a highly self-conscious, articulated evolution in the 
relationships among its governmental centers of power.45 I draw on interviews 
                                                 
40  See HULL, supra note 17, at 129–30 (“The challenge is to collectivization and individuation as 
simultaneous functions of the same bureaucratic process, taking neither the agency of the individual nor the 
organization as given”).  
41  See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 18, at 73 (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
internal “management training materials” discuss the importance of not placing “rookies” and “bastards” on 
work teams that develop regulations).  
42  See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Wanted to Order Justice Dept. to 
Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/president-trump-justice-department.html (detailing the 
ongoing inability of U.S. President Donald Trump to push executive branch administrators to enact his wish 
for a criminal investigation of his opponent in the 2016 presidential election—an investigation he was unable 
to undertake himself, and which he could not effectively order directly).  
43  See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 168–70 (1861).  
44  See generally PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY: A STUDY OF INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONS IN TWO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 251–52 (2d. ed. 1963) (noting that the particular contours of 
bureaucracy will depend on social norms and especially social values in a particular context).  
45  See generally SHELLEY RIGGER, POLITICS IN TAIWAN: VOTING FOR DEMOCRACY (1999) (providing 
a history of Taiwan’s democratization); Jeeyang Rhee Baum, Breaking Authoritarian Bonds: The Political 
Origins of the Taiwan Administrative Procedure Act, 5 J. E. ASIAN STUD. 365 (2005) (elucidating the inter- 
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with around thirty participants in Taiwan’s administrative system, as well as 
numerous more informal conversations with others, that I conducted over the 
course of 2015-2017. 46  My interviewees and interlocutors included 
administrators at a range of levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy and from a 
range of central and city government departments; judges at all levels of the 
public law court system; 47  activists for judicial, administrative, and 
community change; and scholars of law and policy.  
 I also draw on interviews with around thirty U.S. federal administrators, 
which I conducted over the course of 2015-2018.48 These interviews highlight 
the particularities and contingencies of any single country’s experience with 
relating its governmental nodes, and undercut any notion that there is one 
correct or natural way for a democracy to structure that relationship. 49  I 
choose this comparator advisedly, on the assumption that social scientific 
inquiry is always, inevitably, at least implicitly comparative,50 whether we 
compare our object of analysis to another, or to our own preexisting 
predictions about it.51 Indeed, this comparative element of sociological study 
is implicit in Weber’s notion of the ideal type, a hypothesized characterization 
of an object of analysis that is continually revised as researchers discover more 
about the object—a process of discovery that itself is aided by having the ideal 
type as a comparator that helps researchers recognize relevant aspects of the 
object of study. I use evidence from the United States because it so often 
                                                 
and intra-branch considerations that went into the development of Taiwan’s Administrative Procedure Act); 
Jiunn-Rong Yeh, Democracy-Driven Transformation to Regulatory State: The Case of Taiwan, 3 NAT’L 
TAIWAN U. L. REV. 31, 47 (2008) (describing the relationship between democratization and changes to 
regulatory structure); Cheng-Yi Huang, Judicial Deference to Legislative Delegation and Administrative 
Discretion in New Democracies: Recent Evidence from Poland, Taiwan, and South Africa, in COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 466 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010) (discussing evolving 
relations among government branches in Taiwan and other new democracies). 
46  This work builds on my extensive ethnographic work with city government administrators and urban 
political activists in Taipei over the course of 2002–2004, which brought me into regular contact with 
legislators and administrators at the city and national level.   
47  Taiwan has adopted the civil law model of parallel, coequal court systems: one for private and 
criminal law cases, the other for public law cases, in which the government acts as defendant. See Yun-chien 
Chang, An Empirical Study of Administrative Appeal in Taiwan: A Cautionary Tale, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & 
CONTEMP. PROB’S 263, 271 (2014).  
48  These interviews are part of a larger collaboration with Professor Cristina Rodríguez. 
49  As Bruce Ackerman has written, although no one is immune from thinking their way is the right 
way, American political writing is especially susceptible to this kind of myopic assumption. See, e.g., 
Ackerman, supra note 28, at 636 (“Especially since 1989, American jurists have become big boosters of the 
American Way at constitutional conventions everywhere”).   
50  See Anya Bernstein, The Songs of Other Birds, in INSIDERS, OUTSIDERS, INJURIES, AND LAW: 
REVISITING THE OVEN BIRD’S SONG 227 (Mary Nell Trautner ed., 2018) (describing “sociolegal analysis [as] 
inherently comparative”).  
51  See WEBER, supra note 31, at xxxviii–xxxix (Weber’s “ideal type too has a comparative purpose”).  
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serves, in scholarship, as an exemplar of democratic governance—an often-
unnamed comparator against which others are judged.52 Making this usually 
unspoken comparison explicit allows us to ask how separation of powers 
consciousness functions in different systems and illuminate ways in which it 
may ameliorate populist impulses, or pave the way for them. 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS VS. INTERPENETRATION OF POWERS 
 Taiwan’s Constitution specifies how the executive should submit 
legislative bills to the national legislature. 53 That is, it clearly contemplates an 
administrative role in legislation. 54  Agencies are routinely involved in 
producing legislation, both at the request of individual legislators and 
legislative committees, and as an internal process through which the 
administration expresses its preferences and expertise.55 Departments contain 
components specifically tasked with drafting or finalizing legislation to 
propose to the legislature.56 Administrators participate in legislative sessions 
at which numerous drafts of legislation addressing the same topic are voted 
on. These different drafts may, again, be produced by the same agency, in 
response to requests from different legislators and as an expression of the 
administration’s own suggestions. Administrators told me that it was not 
unusual for them to produce draft legislation for a legislator while at the same 
time informing that legislator of the problems with his or her approach. 
 In my interviews across a number of agencies in Taiwan’s central 
government, administrators consistently referred to their intimate and ongoing 
interactions with the legislature. But they never referenced the constitutional 
provision that gave legal expression to this power. Instead, administrators 
presented this power as a key part of the legitimacy of their own actions. 
Drafting and proposing legislation, one high-ranking administrator explained 
to me, “is called accountability. I [the agency] am responsible for these things. 
So when I think that the way we do these things needs to be modified, well, I 
ought to express our suggestions. So for an agency to draft statutory language 
                                                 
52  See commentary, supra note 49. 
53  MINGUO XIANFA art. 58 (1947) (Taiwan).  
54  See Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a Liberal 
and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 531, 560 (2002) (noting that Taiwan’s Constitution 
allows the President to appoint a Premier in charge of the executive branch, creating a “semi-presidential 
(dual-executive) system,” with influences from both presidential and parliamentary systems).  
55  Interviews with Taiwanese government administrators (Dec. 2016, Nov. to Dec. 2017).  
56  Interview with Taiwanese government administrator (Nov. 2017).  
 
April 2019  Interpenetration of Powers 473 
 
is extremely legitimate and reasonable.”57 Her colleague agreed: after all, “the 
agency, it is responsible for its policies,” so it is only right for the agency to 
participate in drafting the laws that those policies implement.58  
 Administrators, of course, do not just produce legislative language but 
also implement it once it is enacted. To assist with that, Taiwan’s legislature 
typically includes a statement of purpose (lifa liyou, reason for statutory 
enactment) for each statutory provision.59 Although this statement of purpose 
is not technically the law, administrators spoke of it as if it were: this was the 
legislature’s instruction to agencies, guiding agency policy to conform to 
statutory purpose. Administrators spoke with discomfort and exasperation 
about the occasional provision that gets enacted without an attached purpose 
statement, and praised a recent development that required the legislature to 
publicly post video recordings of the inter-party negotiations at which the fine 
points of controversial statutory provisions get hammered out, since these 
provide agencies with some indication of how legislators understood the 
provisions they voted on even in the absence of a purpose statement.60 
 For my Taiwanese agency interviewees, agency statute drafting and 
legislative purpose statements form key parts of the ongoing dialogue between 
legislature and executive. In other words, the interpenetration of lawmaking 
powers between the legislature and the administration is not only an aspect of 
constitutional structure. It has become also a part of bureaucratic ethics, one 
way that administrators understand their own proper place in the government 
and relations with other government institutions.61 
 In contrast to the highly interactive image of ongoing conversation 
between agencies and legislature that my Taiwanese interlocutors presented, 
American agency interviewees painted a picture of stark separation. American 
                                                 
57  “Zheige jiaozuo accountability. . . Wo dui zhexie shiqing fu zeren, wo renwei zheixie shiqing zuode 
you xuyao jiantao de shihou wo jiu yinggai yao tichu women de jianyi. Suoyi zai xingzheng bumen tichu fa’an 
shi feichang zhengdang erqie helide. 這個叫做accountability. 我對這些事情負責任，我認為這些事情做
得有需要檢討的時候我就應該要提出我們的建議。所以在行政部門提出法案是非常政黨而且合理
的.” Interview with Taiwanese government administrators (Nov. 2017). 
58  “[T]a xingzheng bumen ta dui tade zhengce fuze 它，行政部門，它對它的正則要負責 .” 
Interview with Taiwanese government administrators (Nov. 2017). 
59  Interviews with Taiwanese government administrators (Dec. 2016, Nov. to Dec. 2017).  
60  Interview with Taiwanese government administrators (Nov. 2017). 
61  Cf. BLAU, supra note 44, at 264–65 (noting that democracy, as a social form suited to deciding on 
goals but not implementing them, is “complementary” to bureaucracy, as a social form suited to 
implementing goals but not deciding on them). Blau, like many researchers of bureaucratic culture, worked 
with front-line administrators rather than those who made regulations; had he worked with the latter, he may 
have seen more decision-making and goal-setting within the bureaucratic agency.  
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administrators never presented interactive co-creation of statutory language 
as a kind of accountability, as most Taiwanese interviewees did. Although 
American administrators generally spoke of their work as implementing 
policy within the parameters of a statutory mandate, they did not generally 
present it as their role to help Congress figure out what it wanted or suggest 
what it should do.  
 Similarly, when asked whether statements by members of Congress 
affected their understanding of a statutory provision, administrators almost 
always said no. Indeed, most administrators indicated that they treat such 
statements with suspicion. A number of administrators, for instance, 
recounted situations in which they understood such statements as attempts to 
change the statute’s meaning, avoid its natural implications, or get an upper 
hand in a legislative negotiation. As one administrator put it when asked about 
Congressional input into statutory meaning, “Was there any ongoing 
discussions or conversation with congressional committees or congressional 
staff? I can tell you absolutely not. Zero. Zero times.”62 Or as another put it, 
“We would get a lot of ‘I wrote this and that’s not what I meant’ [from 
members of Congress], which is obviously not the words on the page, right?”63 
A legislator’s understanding of the statute is just another possible 
interpretation, evaluated like any other.  
 By invalidating the legislative veto on agency action, American judicial 
doctrine has limited the ways in which Congress may override or invalidate 
an agency’s interpretation or implementation of a statute.64 Congress retains 
other tools short of legislative invalidation, such as making pointed 
appropriations decisions and requiring agency personnel to testify before 
Congress. Perhaps surprisingly, American interviewees asked about their 
relations with Congress rarely mentioned these tools, and no interviewee 
presented these methods as ways that Congress effectively influences agency 
decisions.  
                                                 
62  Interview with U.S. federal administrator (Mar. 2018).  
63  Interview with U.S. federal administrator (Feb. 2018). Another administrator said that they had seen 
situations where members of Congress “wrote to [the agency], they wrote letters and saying, ‘Well, this is 
what we meant, this is how you should implement it,’ but the agency can't do that.” Interview with U.S. 
federal administrator (Apr. 2018). 
64  Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that allowing 
Congress to invalidate or override agency action through anything short of the legislative process provided 
for in the U.S. Constitution violates constitutional separation of powers).  
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 On the contrary, the most extensive discussion of the role of 
congressional oversight in my interviews came in an administrator’s 
discussion of the institutional effects of the contemporary legislative 
process—what has been called “unorthodox lawmaking” for the way it 
departs from traditional images of how a bill becomes a law.65 “I think maybe 
before my time in government,” this long-term administrator said, “the 
Congress would work through well-functioning processes of committees, and 
then there'd be a clear record, and then conference committees, and there'd be 
a clear record, and you would have report language really to explain what was 
intended. That doesn't happen anymore.”66 The effect of the absence of clear 
legislative records, moreover, “is . . . a lot more discretion to the agencies to 
interpret.” 67  Legislative disorganization thus empowers the administrative 
state: “Congress writes laws that are these huge balancing acts. They craft 
these very intricate compromises, and different . . . members of Congress have 
different points of view of . . . what they understood was actually passed.” 
That kind of “indecision . . . creates a lot of discretion for the agency.”68 
 In these ways, American administrators consistently presented 
legislation as something Congress creates and then hands to agencies. On this 
description, agencies play little role in creating the statute, and Congress plays 
no role in determining how it is implemented once it is enacted. Yet research 
on the United States has indicated that there, too, administrators often play a 
pivotal role in creating legislation;69 that has been the case for at least most of 
the last century.70 While public opprobrium has fallen to the role of lobbyists 
in producing legislation, scholars have noted that agencies also take part in 
the process.71 Agencies sometimes play the role of editors, giving “technical 
                                                 
65  See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN 
THE U.S. CONGRESS (2016). 
66  Interview with U.S. federal administrator (May 2018). 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Brigham Daniels, Agency as Principal, 48 GA. L. REV. 335, 404 (2014) (“Sometimes Congress asks 
agencies to draft language, and sometimes agencies do so without being asked”).  
70  See, e.g., Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the 
Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L. J. 266, 337 (2013) (“[United States 
a]gency . . . employees drafted bills, provided congressmen with analyses, testified at hearings, and even 
served as ghostwriters for committee reports and floor speeches” starting with the New Deal).  
71  Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside- An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 758 (2014) 
("[O]ur respondents told us that first drafts [of legislation] are typically written by . . . the White House and 
agencies, or policy experts and outside groups, like lobbyists”) 
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drafting assistance” to legislators drafting statutory language.72 Other times, 
agencies draft legislation at the request of Congressional staff, or propose 
statutory drafts of their own accord. 73  Indeed, administrators within the 
American administrative state report that agencies almost always have some 
role in legislative drafting, whether by reviewing it and offering technical 
edits—for instance, to ensure that agency terms of art are used consistently in 
statutes relating to that agency—or by themselves drafting parts of the 
statute. 74  Such input, moreover, involves all levels of the agency, with 
“[c]omments generally flow[ing] up first from an agency’s program offices to 
the legislative affairs and legislative counsel offices within each bureau and 
then on to the departmental level.”75 
 As a factual matter, then, American agencies are highly involved in the 
production of laws passed by the legislature. They may not have an 
independent authority to propose legislation the way their counterparts in 
Taiwan do,76 but they clearly play an important role in producing the language 
that becomes the law. Yet my interviewees across a range of U.S. federal 
agencies did not advert to this role of their own accord and downplayed it 
when asked about it directly. When asked about the agency’s role in drafting 
statutes, interviewees sometimes referred only to the offices concerned with 
communications with Congress, like the office of legislative or Congressional 
affairs; many brushed off agency participation in legislation as largely 
nonexistent or merely technical editing. For instance, one administrator noted 
that their Congressional Affairs Office was quite active and in touch with 
Congress members regularly, but when asked why, responded, “They might 
provide insights on bills in circulation. They’re yelled at by . . . members of 
Congress over particular agency actions.”77 The way that this administrator 
presents being “yelled at” by Congress as part of someone’s job, rather than 
as part of an interactive process of inter-branch influence, matches my 
                                                 
72  Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2017) 
(“Federal agencies . . . help draft statutes in the background by providing ‘technical drafting assistance’ on 
legislation that originates from congressional staffers. Such drafting assistance is often provided 
confidentially—without White House oversight, much less public notice and comment—and continues to be 
provided throughout the legislative process”).  
73  Jarrod Shobe, Agencies as Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of Agencies in the Legislative 
Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 470–73 (2017). 
74  Id. at 484. 
75  Id.  
76  See supra notes 54, 57, & 58 and accompanying text. 
77  Interview with U.S. federal administrator (Mar. 2018).  
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administrative interviewees’ general lack of emphasis on Congress’s ability 
or desire to affect agency action.78 
 American agency interviewees, in sum, presented Congress as lacking 
the ability or the right to speak to the agency beyond the words of the statute. 
And they presented agencies as lacking the ability or the right to create those 
words themselves. This view fits into American constitutional structure, but 
that constitutional structure does not mandate it—indeed to some extent this 
image is belied by the actual practices of American agencies. But it expresses 
a particular view of legitimacy and accountability for administrative agencies.  
 American interviewees presented themselves as remaining accountable 
precisely by keeping their distance from Congress. Their job was to pursue 
policy within the parameters presented by the statutory words, not to have an 
ongoing conversation with legislators about the meanings and purposes of the 
laws. Taiwanese interviewees, in contrast, stressed the centrality of dialogue 
and the collaborative nature of statutory drafting and implementation to 
administrative accountability.  
 The policies that each group implements stem from different origins. 
For most of the post-World War II twentieth century, Taiwan operated as a 
one-party dictatorship ruled by the KMT (guomindang or Chinese Nationalist 
Party).79 The country’s regulatory policies emerged from a relatively closed 
circle centered on the ruling party. Politicians and administrators in the one-
party state were, of course, involved. So were business leaders, who often 
overlapped in terms of social circle and personnel with those KMT operatives. 
Indeed, big businesses were often party-owned to begin with.80 American 
advisors,81 who managed the flood of U.S. subsidies that propped up the 
regime for the first decades of its existence;82 and other U.S. and international 
                                                 
78  See supra text accompanying note 64. 
79  See Bernstein, supra note 19, at 31–33; see generally STEVEN E. PHILLIPS, BETWEEN ASSIMILATION 
AND INDEPENDENCE: THE TAIWANESE ENCOUNTER WITH NATIONALIST CHINA, 1945–1950 (2003).  
80  Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, The State and Business Relations in Taiwan, 1 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 
76, 80–83 (1995) (describing the close and overlapping relationships of Taiwanese businesses and the KMT).  
81  See generally Leonard Gordon, American Planning for Taiwan, 1942–1945, 37 PAC. HIST. REV. 
201 (1968). 
82  See generally THOMAS B. GOLD, STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE TAIWAN MIRACLE 53–55 (1986) 
(explaining that the U.S. gave around $2 billion to the KMT between 1945 and 1949, but, “disgusted with 
[the KMT’s] incompetence and insatiable appetite for funds that simply vanished,” had cut off aid shortly 
before the Communist victory in China in 1949. Aid resumed when “North Korea’s Kim Il-sung entered the 
story as the [KMT’s] deus ex machina by invading South Korea,” leading to the Korean War, which made 
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institutions, greatly influenced Taiwan’s economic policy as well.83 Taiwan 
in the post-War era became a classic developmental state, with tight controls 
on economic activity geared toward shoring up domestic industry,84 followed 
by the encouragement of production for export and domestic labor for foreign 
corporations.85  
 Thus, policy in the post-World War II, pre-democracy era was 
developed within a relatively limited social loop. It was incredibly successful, 
contributing to astonishing economic growth with widespread benefits for 
Taiwan’s residents.86 Today, Taiwan’s Executive branch remains headed by a 
single Premier (Xingzheng Yuanzhang, or Executive Branch Head), who is 
appointed by the President but who has independent reporting duties to the 
legislature.87 The Premier heads up a clearly unitary executive; administrators 
routinely told me that, in the words of one interviewee, “the Premier is my 
boss.”88  
 Nonetheless, the Taiwanese administrators I interviewed did not 
describe their policy development process as streamlined, unified, or closed. 
Nor did they valorize this approach to administrative decision-making by, for 
instance, comparing its efficiency or results favorably to other approaches. 
Instead, administrators consistently emphasized the importance of receiving 
input from multiple perspectives when creating policy.89 Some told me that 
their policy-making process usually began by canvassing approaches to 
related issues in other countries, particularly the United States and Japan.90 
                                                 
Taiwan relevant again to U.S. interests both as a Pacific military base and as part of a strategy of containment 
of Communist forces).  
83  Hsiao, supra note 80, at 79 (describing pressure exerted by the World Bank and USAID on Taiwan 
to make the Taiwanese economy more hospitable to U.S. capital).  
84  See John Ohnesorge, Chinese Administrative Law in the Northeast Asian Mirror, 16 TRANSNAT'L 
L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 103, 108–16 (2006) (explaining the typical characteristics of the Asian 
developmental state).  
85  See Hsiao, supra note 80, at 78–79 (discussing Taiwan’s shift from protectionist to export-oriented 
policies in the 1960s). 
86  See, e.g., Murray A. Rubinstein, Introduction: The “Taiwan Miracle”, in THE OTHER TAIWAN: 1945 
TO THE PRESENT (Murray A. Rubinstein ed., 1994) (lamenting propensity of Western writing on Taiwan to 
focus only on its impressive economic growth and political stability, rather than on other cultural and social 
factors); Samuel P.S. Ho, Economics, Economic Bureaucracy and Taiwan’s Economic Development, 20 PAC. 
AFF. 226, 226–31 (1987) (discussing Taiwan’s dramatic success in the late twentieth century, which the 
author attributes to land redistribution and other economic policies).  
87  See Wang, supra note 54.  
88  “Xingzheng Yuanzhang shi wode laoban 行政院長是我的老闆 .” Interview with Taiwanese 
government administrator (Nov. 2017).  
89  Interviews with Taiwanese government administrators (Dec. 2016, Nov. to Dec. 2017). 
90  Interview with Taiwanese government administrators (Nov. 2017). 
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Many emphasized the centrality of communication with private parties 
through media like meetings, hearings, and online platforms organized by the 
agency.91 
 Taiwan’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA), implemented in 2000, 
mandates some modicum of public consultation for the production of 
regulations. 92  It requires agencies to announce proposed regulations and 
accept public input about them either through comments or public hearings,93 
and to hold hearings for adjudications affecting private interests.94 Yet, when 
I asked administrators how they developed policy, none referred to these 
requirements or procedures, even when discussing public input into the 
policy-making process. Rather, Taiwanese administrators phrased their policy 
development process as an ongoing conversation with the public through a 
range of media that administrators themselves set up and developed for that 
very purpose. Many of the people I talked to were already in government 
service when the Taiwan APA was enacted. Yet when I asked how the law 
had affected their policy-making practices, the common response was 
something along the lines of not much.95 Administrators emphasized that they 
already communicated with interested parties and the public, and already 
reviewed regulations for legality, before the passage of the APA.96  
 Taiwanese administrators thus presented their work as open and 
dialogic, involving many inputs through a range of media. This openness and 
multiplicity, moreover, were clearly valorized; these were presented not as 
last resorts that legal strictures required but the proper, ethical, and 
accountable approaches to making policy.  
                                                 
91  Multiple interviews with Taiwanese government administrators (Dec. 2016, Nov. to Dec. 2017). 
92  See generally JEEYANG RHEE BAUM, RESPONSIVE DEMOCRACY: INCREASING STATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN EAST ASIA (2011) (describing the development of administrative law, and specifically 
Administrative Procedure Acts, in several East Asian countries including Taiwan).  
93  Xingzheng chengxufa (行政程式法) [ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT] art. 154–155 Fawubu 
Fagui Ziliaoku (2010) (amended 2015), https://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0201.asp.  
94  Id. at art. 102. 
95  Interviews with Taiwanese government administrators (Dec. 2016, Nov.–Dec. 2017). When asked 
how the APA had affected her work, one administrator explained that she was already aware of the legal 
basis for agency action before its passage; this person clearly saw the APA as merely codifying existing legal 
requirements and best practices. Interview with Taiwanese government administrator, December 2016.  
96  In the U.S. context, some have also argued that the Administrative Procedure Act largely enacted 
practices that were already prevalent in the administrative state rather than imposing completely new or 
unusual requirements. JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE POLITICS 
SINCE THE NEW DEAL 11 (2012) (arguing that the passage of the APA did little to change the practices of 
many agencies, which had already developed the internal processes that the APA codified).  
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 In contrast to their Taiwanese counterparts, my American 
administrative interviewees all entered a government already governed by the 
American Administrative Procedure Act, which was enacted in 1946.97 Their 
careers were structured by its requirements, including the well-known “notice 
and comment” rulemaking process of announcing agency regulatory plans; 
accepting commentary from the public;98 and responding to those comments 
in finalized regulations.99 Yet in interviews, many American administrators 
downplayed the role of public input in their work. Their descriptions of the 
regulatory process focused for the most part on the work on either side of 
public input: interviewees described the extensive processes involved in 
producing a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and the workflow of producing 
responses to public comment.  
 This is not to say that American administrators’ attitude toward public 
input was uniform across agencies. Many agreed that public comments can 
change the course of rulemaking, usually by alerting agencies to unforeseen 
practical effects of proposed rules.100 Occasionally, American administrators 
said that public input affects agency policy, as when some agencies undertake 
“listening tours” to gather information about issues on the ground from 
regulated or affected parties.101 Employees in one smaller agency explained 
that they often used public input as a way to spur regulatory innovation.102 
Generally, though, American administrators did not present as an impetus for 
rulemaking or as central to the regulatory decision-making public comments 
process the way their Taiwanese counterparts did. Instead, public opinion 
often took the form of a surprising cameo appearance: a source of occasionally 
useful information you might not have thought of. It was not, however, usually 
described as a mainstay or a necessity. Unlike their Taiwanese counterparts, 
my American interviewees did not present themselves as primarily engaged 
in an ongoing conversation with the public they served.  
 Instead, American administrators presented policy as emerging largely 
from the administrative state itself. The American state is not nearly as clear-
                                                 
97  Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 5 U.S.C. § 500 
et seq. (1946)).  
98  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2017) (requiring agencies to publicize a notice of proposed rulemaking, accepting 
public comments, and provide a statement of the basis for their final regulatory decisions).  
99  See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that 
agency must explain its reasoning and factual basis for a final rule).  
100  Interviews with U.S. federal administrators (Feb. to Mar. 2018). 
101  Interview with U.S. federal administrator (May 2018). 
102  Interviews with U.S. federal administrators (Feb. 2018). 
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cut a case of unified executive as the Taiwanese. But in interviews, American 
administrators tended to describe decision-making and policy production as a 
fairly closed circuit. This circuit involved personnel in the component 
agency—the particular office within a larger department where policy was 
being formulated—as well as those within the larger department itself. It also 
involved component agencies in the Executive Office of the President, like 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Domestic Policy 
Council.103 
 I make no claims here about the extent of actual interaction with private 
parties outside the agency that either the American or the Taiwanese 
administration engages in. My concern is with the way that administrators 
imagine and depict their participation in governance, and the way they 
understand governing bodies to be structured. Since these are the people who 
carry out—or obstruct—the wishes of legislatures and leaders, their 
understanding of the role they occupy seems highly relevant to grasping the 
potentialities of populism. 
 When Taiwanese administrators describe their work, they tend to focus 
on the wide range of partners with whom they engage in ongoing dialogue as 
they develop policies and finalize regulations. They present their work as open 
and engaged with the legislature and relevant sectors of the public. 
Administrators describe the publics they communicate with in numerous ways: 
as interest groups pushing their preferences and agendas; experts and scholars 
who participate in regulatory drafting; affected parties whose interests are put 
at issue; and citizens at large. The lines of authority and influence that 
Taiwanese administrators describe when discussing their work tend to be 
variegated and multidirectional. On this image, there are a lot of speakers in a 
conversation that goes on and on, and they influence one another in different 
ways over time. Thus, my Taiwanese interviewees presented their agencies as 
part of an interactive interpenetration of powers among differently situated 
participants.  
 American administrators, in contrast, present a smaller, more insulated 
loop. Administrative work is concentrated within the administration, and 
largely centered in the component agency itself. They often describe the 
impetus for decisions, and the decision-making process, as an interactive 
process among people in the component agency, other components in the 
                                                 
103  See Cass Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838 (2012).  
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same department, and central executive offices. Outside influences, including 
legislatures and the public, are depicted as just that: outside. They may push 
the agency in one direction or another, but administrators do not describe them 
as integrated into an ongoing interaction through which decisions are made. 
Rather, each sector has its own role, with interactions among sectors 
minimized: not an interpenetrating distribution, but a rather static separation, 
of powers.104  
IV. SEPARATION, INTERPENETRATION, AND EXECUTIVE CONSOLIDATION  
 These two different visions of government structure have implications 
for populism. Interviewees in the American administrative state seem to have 
imbibed a relatively recent understanding of separations of powers in which 
each branch is as sealed off as possible from the others—a vision in which 
each branch is internally unified around its one particular kind of work and 
jealously guards its boundaries against outside incursion. 105  This vision 
presents a particular image of how government branches do, and should, 
interact: in a relationship not of power-sharing so much as of power-
hoarding.106  
 The separate-and-jealous image of federal government organization 
was popularized by conservative U.S. legal practitioners in the 1980s and has 
gained great prominence in American legal discourse.107 Its proponents argue 
that the Constitution’s text requires this approach.108  Like any legal text, 
though, the Constitution can plausibly give rise to multiple interpretations,109 
including multiple understandings of the nature of executive power. That may 
                                                 
104  For a discussion of the choice between “collaboration” and “confrontation” between the legislative 
and judicial branches, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 108–12 (2009) (describing the passage of the poll tax 
provision of the Voting Rights Act as an unusual attempt by Congress to collaborate rather than compete 
with the Supreme Court, and the Court’s rejection of that invitation).  
105  See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 5–11 (1994) (outlining the theory of the unitary executive).  
106  See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 217 (2005) 
(arguing that Congress “cannot regulate the President’s constitutional powers”). 
107  Id. 
108  Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
YALE L.J. 541, 557 (1994) (arguing that constitutional interpretation must focus on constitutional text, which 
suggests an internally unitary executive that is also externally not subject to constraint by other parties).  
109  See generally Anya Bernstein, Before Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (2017) (arguing that 
any legal text is subject to multiple interpretations at two key points—when the interpreter selects a focus for 
interpretation, and when she situates that object of interpretation into a broader linguistic, factual, or 
ideological context).   
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help explain why the starkly separated view of government propounded in 
unitary executive theory is itself of such recent provenance.110 
 Interviewees in American agencies largely describe their government 
branch in a way that follows this recently prominent description. Agencies are 
presented as closed off from both Congress and the populace. In some cases, 
this closed-off quality focuses on governmental structure, as when 
interviewees describe how they reject attempts by individual legislators to 
control the meaning of an enacted statutory provision because a single 
member’s opinion cannot be imputed to the enacting Congress as a whole. 
But the commitment to separation also has a larger, more amorphous character: 
it takes on a kind of ethical valence, with an implicit claim about what 
constitutes legitimate executive action. 111  Too much interaction between 
Congress and the administration, my interviewees’ responses suggest, sullies 
administrative decision-making. It subjects agencies to congressional whims 
or the interests of individual members of Congress. This may not be deemed 
unconstitutional, but it appears democratically inappropriate. Similarly, while 
American interviewees showed respect for the input of the public through 
comments, they generally avoided presenting themselves as substantially 
influenced by such public opinion.  
 There is nothing necessarily harmful about this view of the executive 
branch as sealed off from outside influence. But it is notable how amenable it 
is to the kind of populist impulses described in Part I. The populist leader 
presents himself as the one able to understand the true needs of the people and 
to act on their behalf, bypassing the standard structures of democratic 
representation in the legislature. But he also resists constraint by the public, 
positioning himself instead as the only chosen one to speak on its behalf.  
 Though I suspect that few of my American interviewees would have 
much sympathy for populism, the assumption of deeply separate powers they 
expressed supports the populist’s rejection of constraint by the public and its 
elected representatives. Irrespective of any personal commitments, the 
implicit understanding of how government ought to work that many 
interviewees expressed fits well into an anti-republican ideology of 
                                                 
110  Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive 
Power, 106 CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (2018) (describing the recent rise of unitary executive theory).  
111  See generally Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. (2018) 
(describing implicit claims to legitimacy in the context of judicial opinions).  
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governing.112 It does not foment populism, but it does provide a convenient 
channel for populist impulses. 
 Taiwanese administrators, in contrast, work in a structurally unitary 
executive explicitly headed by a Premier. But they present their government 
quite differently. Rather than shoring up a unified block and seeking to 
maintain its imperviousness to outside influence, Taiwanese interviewees 
presented themselves as seeking outside influence out. When asked about 
their work, they tended to describe it not in terms of internal agency process 
but in terms of iterative dialogues with multiple parties. These outside parties 
included both the legislature—individual legislators, legislative groups, and 
the legislature as a body—and the public—including individual commentators 
on agency announcements, scholars and experts recruited to help agencies 
research issues and write regulations, interested parties convened to meetings 
with agency personnel, and interest groups that exerted pressure on and 
provided advice to agency decision makers.  
 Like their American counterparts, moreover, Taiwanese administrators 
did not describe this governance format as a necessary, unavoidable result of 
their constitutional structure. Rather, administrators presented this messier 
image, of an administrative apparatus subject to multiple sources of oversight, 
influence, and constraint, as the legitimate way to work in their democracy. 
Populist desires to bypass legislative and popular constraint does not fit 
comfortably with this image of appropriate governance as highly interactive 
and amenable to outside influence.  
 Would-be populists who want to mold government to their wishes 
cannot do it alone. They depend on government administrators to implement 
their plans and policies.113 I have argued here that understanding populism 
therefore requires understanding the administrators who carry it out. The 
research presented here takes a small step toward increasing our knowledge 
of this mysterious social group. It does suggest, though, that an understanding 
of government as composed by starkly separated, maximally independent 
powers may provide channels along which populist impulses can flow to 
power. In contrast, viewing government as inherently messy and multifarious 
can throw up obstacles to the consolidation of power in any one node. 
Despite—or perhaps because of—Taiwan’s relatively short experience with 
                                                 
112  See Ackerman, supra note 28 (noting the potentially pathological results of American style 
separation of powers). 
113  See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 31, at 993 (“[A]gainst the bureaucracy the ruler remains powerless”). 
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democratic governance, Taiwanese administrators’ understanding of their 
own government suggests fewer channels for populist impulses, and more 
obstacles to them, than the understandings of their American counterparts.  
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